- Conceptual Change among Students in Science. ERIC Digest.
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- Reconsidering Conceptual Change: Issues in Theory and Practice
- Tackling Misconceptions Through Conceptual Change – Part I
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Conceptual Change among Students in Science. ERIC Digest.
Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66 2 , Roth, W. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 31 1 , Schommer, M. Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on comprehension. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82 3 , Sinatra, G.
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40, Songer, N. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 28, Stathopoulou, C.
Exploring the relationship between physics-related epistemological beliefs and physics understanding. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 32, Conceptual change in physics and physics-related epistemological beliefs: A relationship under scrutiny. Thoermer, C. New Ideas in Psychology, 20, Tsai, C. An analysis of scientific epistemological beliefs and learning orientations of Taiwanese eighth graders. Science Education, 82, Toulmin, S. Human understanding: The collective use and evolution of concepts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wood, J. Windschitl, M. Using computer simulations to enhance conceptual change: The roles of constructivist instruction and student epistemological beliefs.
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35 2 , Yang, F. Student views concerning evidence and the expert in reasoning a socioscientific issue and personal epistemology. Educational Studies, 31 1 , Youn, I. Yang, K. An analysis of the nature of epistemological beliefs: Investigating factors affecting the epistemological development of South Korean high school students.
Asia Pacific Education Review, 2, J: Umm.
Reconsidering Conceptual Change: Issues in Theory and Practice
It's the same as the force you're exening on the book. I: Alright, what about the force of the book on the table as I'm pushing this thing along? Is there a sideways force? So friction is pushing on the book that way against the motion. The book is not pushing on the table either way. The reason for this failure to use the same principle in almost the same context a failure of alignment due to context sensitivity in the causal net is not evident in the available process data here.
However, in other parts of the set of interviews, J shows that she thinks friction is simply a different kind of force, and, perhaps, she therefore believes it is not susceptible to the use of "action and reaction. Below, the interviewer tries to make the reaction force of the table salient by invoking another principle.
In many contexts J exhibited articulate, reflective and deep commitment to the principle that if there is motion, there is a force. The interviewer puts a paper under the book and shows that it moves when you push the book hence implicating a force on it. J declines the use of her own principle here. If contact is creating motion, then there is no need for a force. So, suppose I said that I have to hold it because the book is exerting a force on the paper.
J: I think it's just sliding, and I think it's just bringing the paper with it. I mean, it's a really simple situation I would just say that it's [the book is] sliding against the table and bringing the paper with it. To sum up, we ohserve in this process data an expectable fragmentation in context dependencies.
In two cases, explicit principles that function as causal net inferences are applied in some contexts, but not others. In one case, the reason for this context dependence seems clearly the salience of a particular p-prim in a particular context. Because contact can convey motion, the principle that motion requires a force doesn't apply to this case. A BRIEF REVIEW In order to make the connection between my original critique of conceptual change research and what I have displayed concerning "conceptual ecology" more clear, I will undertake a brief review in terms of the program I set out for the chapter, following the critique.
Tackling Misconceptions Through Conceptual Change – Part I
Both p-prims and coordination classes are much more specific than dictionary definitions and typical invocations of, for example, "concepts" or "theories" in conceptual change research. We have discussed the nature of elements, their origins, what happens during development, the function of the knowledge types, typical patterns of use, and the level and kinds of systematicity between elements and across contexts. More on the laner appears in the next section. Table I reviews some of the main points.
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Empirical investigations are necessary to venfy that any hypothetical p-prim or coordination class has the necessary properties. P-prims, for example, account for intuitive predictIons and judgments of plausibility. Coordination classes provide a specific model of a type of full-blown concept, which entails a lot about the difficult and easy parts of conceptual change. Following our discussion, summarized in Table I, p-prims and coordination classes contrast in many ways with each other. Theoretically, there is no way to mistake one for the other.
More broadly, rfully expect that we will need many other knowledge types to fully explain the transition from naTve student to conceptually-competent physicist. Starting from the last question, establishing appropriate span and alignment is difficult, and we should expect continued examples of failures of this sort in the trajectory toward competence. Not only did we document failures of these types in a subject's process data,. That p-prim contact conveys motion "explained" a situation a paper moving under a pushed book and thus aborted the use of an articulate principle for this subject , that motion requires the existence of a force.
P-prims explain many wrong expectations-and many correct "ones-that students have about how the world works. They also explain phenomena like data fluidity and the general richness and detail found in intl;litive thought. P-prims explain the emergence of particular macro-constructions e. How do p-prims and coordination classes relate to "theories" or "mental models," and so on? In general this is not a particularly good game to play precisely because of the clements of our earlier critique; most advocates of these terms say precious little about what they actually entail.
Nonetheless, I can make some comments that may be at least heuristically useful. P-prims are obviously sub- r.
They are too small to constitute any of. Coordination classes, we have argued, are an appropriate refinement of the idea of "concept. For example, force.
Developmentally, therefore, there are likely to be important mutual mfluences in coordination classes that participate in the same theory. I believe language introduces important propertIes that may not hold in dominantly inarticulate knowledge systems. DISESSA such as spatial reasoning, 2 allow explicit hypothetical reasoning, and 3 involve only a small, well-defined class of causal inferences diSessa, It is possible, for example, that a limited set of p-prims e.
However, other principles might define the causality in a mental model, aside from p-prims. Furthermore, the involvement of p-prims wouldn't necessarily entail the ability to support explicit hypothetical reasoning.